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Structural Regulation of the Media
and the Diversity Rationale
Jerome A. Barron*
Structural regulations of the media-such as the multiple ownership
rules-play a useful role in media governance in the United States. Under
Chairman William E. Kennard, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has struggled, in a climate unsympathetic to regulation, to keep the
basic core of the multiple ownership rules while substantially modifying
their specific applications. Their modification recognizes the emergence of
new technologies and new channel capacity, but their basic retention also
recognizes the need for diversity in all its meanings. In this paper, I shall
argue that the case for structural regulation of the media is stronger now
than it has ever been.
On August 5, 1999, the FCC relaxed its duopoly rule. Under the
original duopoly rule, the FCC did not permit the grant of a license to
anyone already holding a license for the same type of facility in the same
community. The FCC has modified this rule and declared that it now
permits common ownership of two stations in the same market if eight
independently owned and operated television stations remain in the same
market post merger. One of the merged stations cannot be among the top
four ranked stations in the designated market area.'
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School;
B.A., Tufts University, 1955; J.D., Yale Law School, 1958; L.L.M., George Washington
University Law School, 1960. This Article is based on a paper presented on January 8,
2000, to the Mass Communication Section at the annual meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools in Washington, D.C. Professor Barron would like to thank Odin
A. Smith of the George Washington Law School Class of 2001 for his excellent research
assistance.
1. See Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999) [hereafter Revised
Duopoly Report]. In its revised duopoly rule report, the FCC stated that a principal rationale
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The role of media structure in our society has, in view of the revision
of the duopoly rule and the subsequent Viacom-CBS merger proven to be a
timely choice of topic. On September 7, 1999, Viacom Inc. announced that
it would buy CBS in a deal valued at approximately forty billion dollars. At
the time of the merger, Viacom properties included nineteen television
stations and a controlling interest in a TV network, UPN. Viacom owns
cable channels such as MTV, Nickelodeon, VHl, and Showtime pay movie
channels.
CBS provides programming to its television (and radio) affiliates
throughout the nation. CBS itself owns and operates fifteen television
stations in major markets and the dominant interest in Infinity
Broadcasting, which owns one hundred sixty radio outlets. CBS owns the
cable channels, The Nashville Network (TNN) and Country Music
Television (CMT), as well as the TV syndication, King World. CBS also
2has a presence on the Internet.
The deal between Sumner Redstone, Viacom's chief executive, and
Mel Karmazin, CBS's chief executive, was announced shortly after the
FCC relaxed its television duopoly rule. The Viacom-CBS mergers results
in television duopolies in six markets.3
Some regulatory obstacles remain. Presently, a single entity may not
operate two broadcast networks. Since Viacom already owns fifty percent
of UPN (Paramount Pictures) and now would own CBS as well,
technically, it would have to divest itself of UPN. The television stations
that will be operated by the merged company exceed the rule that no entity
may own television stations whose audience reach is greater than thirty-
five percent of the national audience. The merged Viacom-CBS entity
would reach forty-one percent of all households nationwide.4
The concentration of ownership within the communications media
that the Viacom-CBS merger represents is amazing. Yet, these
developments only seem to whet the appetite of the participants for more.
Recently, when asked how Viacom-CBS hoped to meet the 35% TV
audience reach cap, Mr. Karmazin stated: "We believe that the 35% cap is
a very antiquated rule. We believe that the rule will go away."5 What
for multiple ownership rules such as the duopoly rule is to encourage diversity in the
ownership of broadcast stations in order to encourage the expression of a variety of
viewpoints on broadcasting.
2. See Paul Farhi, Viacom to Buy CBS, Uniting Multimedia Heavyweights, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at Al, A7.
3. See John M. Higgins, One Thing Leads to Another, BRDCST. & CABLE, Sept. 13,
1999, at 14.
4. See Farhi, supra note 2, at Al, A7.
5. The Viacom Vision, BRDCST. & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1999, at 30.
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should the television audience reach TV cap be for a single entity? Mr.
Karmazin responded: "a realistic move that politically could make sense is
that it would be 50%.,,6 A week later, Mr. Karmazin said that the cap has to
be at least 49% for the network television business to be viable.7
An almost centrifugal force now impels media to combine. What
motivates this quest to accumulate ever more media power? Does it reflect
a desire to control the engines of opinion to spread a particular social or
political doctrine? Long-time media critic Ken Auletta responds
trenchantly to these questions: "'When [Viacom Chairman] Sumner
Redstone and [CBS President] Mel Karmazin sat down to discuss this deal,
do you think a major point of discussion was 'How do you improve the
quality of CBS news?' ... These are not men who consume the product
they produce. They are businessmen, business engineers." s
Economics, not politics, energizes this relentless accumulation of
media properties by a few corporate media. The incidental effect is the
accumulation of media power by an ever-smaller number of media
companies. Vertical integration is the theme of the Viacom-CBS merger.
Viacom is strong on content since it owns UPN. CBS has been stronger on
distribution than content. Mr. Karmazin commented on the synergy
between the two companies: "As [Redstone] said 'content is king' and we
believe distribution is king." 9
In the revised duopoly rule report, we encounter three diversity
rationales for multiple ownership rules. The first is to encourage greater
gender, ethnic, and racial diversity in the ownership of broadcast stations.
The second is to limit multiple ownership of the media in order to
maximize diversity of viewpoint in programming. The third is based on the
idea that media deconcentration rules will prevent "undue concentration of
economic power contrary to the public interest."10 Limiting concentration
minimizes the ability of a small group of corporate media to dominate the
local opinion process."
6. Id. at 32.
7. See Steve McClellan, Viacom-CBS Wants Two Years to Divest, BRicsT. & CABLE,
Nov. 22, 1999, at 10.
8. Howard Kurtz, Good News for CBS? Observers Split on Merger, WASH. POST,
Sept. 8, 1999, at El (alteration in original).
9. Farhi, supra note 2, at A7.
10. Revised Duopoly Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, para. 15, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1999) (quoting Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476-77 (1964) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Order]).
11. "[The greater the diversity of ownership in a particular area, the less chance there
is that a single person or group can have 'an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or
similar programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level." Multiple Ownership
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With regard to the racial and gender diversity rationale, clearly, the
goal is to encourage minority and gender-oriented programming by
increasing participation of minorities and women in broadcast ownership.12
The second diversity rationale is viewpoint diversity. The FCC sees
viewpoint diversity as a causal effect of media deconcentration. 3 The entire
diversity rationale is presently under attack. Diversity of viewpoint as a
justification for multiple ownership rules is especially under siege. For
those who believe, as do I, that there is a relationship between ownership
diversity and diversity in ideas, the attack is misguided. The personal attack
rules are under assault as well. The FCC has abolished the fairness
doctrine. If policies to stimulate diversity of viewpoint in broadcasting
remain, the duopoly rule and the audience reach cap, etc. are the only ones.
In the duopoly report, the FCC reasoned that the identity and
viewpoint of the station's owner can shape the station's programming.
Suppose the merged ownership has no viewpoint. Many defend the deal
between Viacom and CBS on grounds of synergy: Viacom is strong on
distribution, CBS on content. When Redstone said that content was king,
the implication is that content is a kind of filler. Certainly, a justification
for rules restricting multiple ownership is they tend to prevent the shrinking
of the total number of media owners. The hope is that the larger the number
of media owners, the greater the possibility that there will be some for
whom content is not filler.
The third diversity rationale for multiple ownership rules is to limit
the control a small number of individuals or companies can exercise over
the opinion process through media ownership. Chairman Kennard says that
the remaining revised multiple ownership rules reflect "core values of
competition, diversity, and localism."' 14 The remaining multiple ownership
rules, he argues, strike an "appropriate balance, by relaxing rules but
maintaining a diversity floor."'"
What is the impact of a merger like Viacom-CBS on the world of
ideas and on the discourse and debate that the First Amendment is
supposed to protect and encourage? In his dissent to the revised duopoly
rule, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth argues that the multiple ownership
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, para. 3 (footnote omitted).
12. See Revised Duopoly Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, para. 13, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1.
13. "One of the most important purposes of our multiple ownership rules is to
encourage diversity in the ownership of broadcast stations so as to foster a diversity of
viewpoints in the material presented over the airwaves." Id. at para. 17.
14. Id. app. c at 12,981-82 (Chairman William E. Kennard, Remarks at the Aug. 5,




rules should not have been relaxed; they should have been abolished.
Diversity, he contends, has no measure nor meaning. Additionally, no
evidence of harm or abuse flowing from common ownership support these
rules. For these reasons, they fail to meet the strict scrutiny standard that
should be applied to them.
What does diversity mean? Does it mean numerosity of outlets? Does
it mean numerosity of owners? Does it signify an abundance of formats? Is
diversity just news and information? Is diversity ethnically and racially
oriented programming? Is diversity defined by programming on
controversial issues seeking to cover the range of opinion on such issues?
16
Furchtcott-Roth suggests that if we provide a specific answer to any of
these questions, First Amendment tensions are inevitable. 17 Diversity as a
goal for media governance is, in this view, at odds with the First
Amendment. If diversity is simply a generalized goal, it is impermissibly
vague. If diversity is framed in specific terms to encourage a particular kind
of expression, then it is a content-based violation of the First Amendment.
I reject this attack. Criticism of multiple ownership rules on First
Amendment grounds is not new. More than twenty years ago, the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's prohibition on cross-ownership on First
Amendment grounds. The Court deemed the policy reasonable because "it
promot[ed] the 'public interest' in diversification of the mass
communications media" and it furthered rather than contravened the system
of free expression."
Should the advent of new media technologies with their abundant
channel capacity change this conclusion? Certainly, the number of
electronic media outlets has vastly increased since the cross ownership case
but so has the degree of concentration of ownership.
The diversity rationale is particularly responsive to First Amendment
values. In the cross-ownership case, the Supreme Court accepted the FCC's
16. See icL app. c at 12,993-13,002 (dissenting statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
17. See id.
18. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775 (1978). However,
government intervention in media concentration is not always an unalloyed good. Professor
Ed Baker has wisely observed:
The [contrary] argument here would be that the constitutional decision is to
prohibit intervention because allowing the press to remain untouched best protects
its democratic role.
.. . The perceived merits of permitted intervention necessarily reflects an
understanding of what democracy requires, an evaluation of the dangers of
misguided intervention, and an assessment of the market.
C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 389-90
(1998).
19. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. at 799.
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assumption that one could not expect divergence in viewpoint from
commonly owned media entities to be the same as if these entities were
antagonistically owned.20 This was so, even though diversity resists both
definition and quantification. Accordingly, the Court upheld the FCC's
judgment that "'it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from commonly
owned station-newspaper combination.','
In a hard-hitting new book, Robert McChesney contends that the
future will see a global media oligopoly dominated by six firms: Time
Warner, Disney, Viacom, News Corporation, Sony, and Seagram.2
Professor McChesney concludes: "by any known theory of democracy,
such a concentration of economic, cultural, and political power into so few
hands-and mostly unaccountable hands at that-is absurd and
unacceptable." 3 This is undoubtedly true. Yet it is increasingly difficult for
our society to come to grips with it. At a certain level and scale,
concentration of media ownership constitutes a social harm in and of itself.
Government should not dominate or control the opinion process, but a
handful of media corporations should not be allowed to do so either.
The regulatory structure of a less commercial age still exists in part,
but its rigor is constantly being weakened. In part, this is due to what
Professor McChesney correctly calls the rise of a new First Amendment
theology. A dogma or myth in this new theology is that the First
Amendment "authorizes the corporate control and hyper-commercialization
of media and communication."24 Another dogma in this theology is that the
First Amendment belongs to the media and, therefore, that interference
with the organization and structure of the media somehow violates the First
Amendment. To date, the Court has not accepted these contentions and,
indeed, on several recent occasions has been resistant to them. But a
constant media campaign praises and publicizes this new First Amendment
theology. The result is that the need for, and the justice of, some regulation
of the media consolidation that is now occurring all about us is obscured.
For a democratic society, the justice of rules designed to make sure that a
few people or a few entities do not run away with the opinion process
should not be suspect. If diversification of ownership policies have no more
justification than limiting such domination, then the case for their validity
is established.
20. See id. at 797.
21. Id.
22. See ROBERT W. MCCHEsNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
PoLIIcs IN DuBIous TIMEs 27-28 (1999) (quoting Capital Research Mutual Fund Director,
Gordon Crawford).
23. Id. at 30.
24. Id. at 257.
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